Jürgen
Hengelbrock, Bochum
The
Relationship between African and European Philosophers
What It
Ought To Be
Friedrich
Nietzsche has given a definition of concept which I find very fruitful. He
wrote in Beyond Good and Evil: "Words are sounding signs of concepts,
but concepts are more or less pictorial signs for sensations which recur and
are coming together, for groups of sensations. In order to understand each
other it is not sufficient to use the same words: we must use the same words
for the same species of interior events, in the end we must have our experience
in common". (§ 268)
If Nietzsche is right, the answer to the question:
"Can we have our experience in common?" is decisive for intercultural
relationship and for intercultural philosophical communication.
There are tendencies in contemporary
philosophy which in their results deny the possibility of common experiences,
even if that is not their intention. If you say that man or mankind live and realize themselves in cultural
horizons, and that all activities and expressions of man (manual, sensual,
intellectual) are formed and imbued by the culture in which man was born,
you must doubt the possibility not only of communication of experience, but
also of the existence of common human experience. For in this case there is
no primary experience before culture, but all experience is constituted, mediated
or interpreted by a specific culture.
Consequently mankind divides into
cultural biotopes, and the first ethical claim would be to preserve all human
biotopes.
I recognise the profound humanistic
inspiration of this thinking. However, "humani nihil a me alienum puto"
(nothing human seems strange to me), this saying of Terentius expresses that there is not a privileged
idea of man, but that mankind adopts an infinite number of forms which are
all species of equal value. Consequently there is no longer any justification
for colonization or more subtle forms of tutelage, because there is no superiority
of one civilisation above another.
Mankind can be named by all names
because there is no name which is really appropriate, which can be applied
univocally to all people. "Omninominabilis quia innominabilis":
the ancient theologians of the Christian church said that we can speak of
God only in a negative way, expressing what he is not, because God transcends
all categories of thinking.
I use this epistemological principle
of ancient theology not for rhetorical embellishment. Denying the existence
of one God for one mankind or enclosing God in the cultural biotope, modern thought is inclined to deify culture
which becomes the new divinity and from which man is not authorised to escape.
We assist so at a renaissance of polytheism.
There is something like this in the
relationship between European professors and African students. When African
students address themselves to us for a scholarship with intent to write a
thesis at a European university, they in general propose as subject a study
on a European philosopher, for example on Kant, Hegel or Schelling . In this case we are a little embarrassed,
because there are thousands of studies on Kant, Hegel and Schelling, and we
don’t understand why a young African comes to us in order to add another study
which will interest hardly anybody. We are also not able to convince juries
of foundations to accord scholarship for such studies. So we propose to write
a thesis about traditional African philosophical thought, which is unknown
here and can delight the juries. I have always met disapproval when I suggested
this proposition. Writing about Hegel, African colleagues want to leave their
cultural biotope to be recognised as fellows of the international community
of research, irrespective of their cultural origin. They just want to emancipate
themselves from their cultural biotope. Turned back to their African tradition,
they might consider themselves in a situation similar to that of a tropical
animal which ventures an escape from a zoological garden.
I exaggerate, surely, I also recommend to write theses about African
thought, but I believe that the described reaction of offence is not completely
out of place. Denying the possibility of man to transcend cultural horizons
and to reach a position beyond and above them, we divide mankind in several
species and necessarily the question will arise and remain: which is the most
beautiful, the most intelligent, the profoundest species or culture?
I think it is an overestimation of
man (which the Greeks called „hybris“) to celebrate the abundance of cultural
diversities and particularities. At least this celebration counteracts its
own moral intention to avoid privileges for one culture, and to respect the
right of particularity and the right of being different.
It seems to me that there is, beyond
all cultural differences, a real and substantial identity and universality
of man in a very basic and at the same time in a very modest manner. I would
not recur, however, to a universality of reason or to a metaphysical definition
of the common nature of man.
Wherever you are in the world, there
are a number of basic appeals and repulsions which you understand immediately:
sexual appeal, appeal of power, pride, desire for beauty, feeling of hatred,
hunger, illness, joy, suffering from confinement, fear of death, and faith, unfaithfulness, jealousy.
Prior to culture, there are a lot of biological and psychological facts which
are always the same. Recent genetic research proved that mankind descended
from one group of ancestors and that genetic differences in mankind amount
only to 4 %. From this genetic heritage biological and psychological facts
originate which create identical conditions of pursuit of happiness in all
cultures. And since mankind lives in one and the same world with identical
fundamental structures, there are the same conditions of work (in Marxian
sense), there are the same conditions of naturalisation of man and humanisation
of nature. This is the common basis of culture.
This universality of human condition
(„la condition humaine“ according to Sartre) creates a categorical basis of human
understanding because we all have the same basic urges and sufferings. I speak
of a categorical basis in the sense of Aristotle: Categories are not what is
perceived and named, but the means by which man perceives and names.
The forms of perception are not the contents of perceptions.
Once you pass from this categorical
level on to the contents of perceptions and knowledge, to the concrete contents
of wishes and sufferings, culture intervenes. There is no immediate perception
or desire. All perceptions and wishes need symbolic representation in our
minds. This symbolic representation develops various forms of expressions
like gestures, clothing, images, languages, tales, myths ... and this is the
origin of culture. Culture penetrates and interprets the categorical basis
of human life and provides forms of symbolic expression and concrete realization.
This level of conscious and subconscious
symbolic representation and imagination is the source of all creative activities
of men facing problems of survival, and it gives orientation and meaning to
individual and collective existence. It is the real wealth of man which enables
him to create areas of life beyond the necessity of biological survival (festivals,
customs, art, literature, plays etc.). At this level mankind develops cultural
horizons which offer a complete orientation of all sectors of individual and
social life. Man needs no other orientation for a life of happiness.
But man has just not been content inventing symbolic worlds of representation
and orientation. There is a spirit of contest which pushes him to question
symbols, to cast doubt on them; this shows that man is not confined to symbolic
worlds and that there is a transcendence of the first (categorical) and the
second (symbolic) level, a transcendence which Jean-Paul Sartre calls nothingness or liberty and
the German Helmut Plessner the „eccentricity“ of human existence.
This transcendence of symbols has enabled man to form non-symbolic tools for
the conception of reality: abstractions by which he could condense and manipulate
(by logical operations) groups of sensations and perceptions. So mankind has
emancipated itself from symbols, from the myth which has confined it to more
or less fortuitous worlds. This step was the birth of a reasonable conception
of reality, the birth of philosophy which finally resulted in the birth of
the sciences in the modern sense of the word.
Defining philosophy as a third level
of human mental architecture and as a logical and conceptual form of proceeding,
I do not wish to devaluate the symbolic level, declaring it as merely accidental
and chaotic. The symbolic world organises itself in logical structures and
achieves in its elaborated form a primary conceptual level. This primary conceptual
organisation of the world where concepts are bundles of perceptions, each
represented by an intellectual sign or idea, I prefer to call wisdom. Auguste
Comte attached it to the „theological age
of mankind“. Wisdom is the treasure of experiences and of creative possibilities
of mankind. Compared to it, philosophy is very poor. Philosophy does not invent.
Invention is the domain of imagination. The task of philosophy is the systematic,
logical, critical examination of experience or wisdom in order to achieve
coherent, well-founded conceptions of world and action. Philosophy needs wisdom;
otherwise it is running idle. Wisdom needs philosophy; otherwise it will become
a prisoner of the past, of a petrifaction which prevents man from facing changes
and the future. Tradition or cultural identity is not in itself a value, its
value depends on its ability to find solutions to the problems of the present
and the future. Marcien Towa has clarified this question in a
definitive way. There is a mutual rivalry of wisdom and philosophy. Heraclitus
said that war is the father of all things. In this war wisdom has the authority
of an old man, whereas philosophy is always a bit in puberty. But Aristotle did not like the old men. They invent
nothing and they weigh hard upon youths and adults who have to assure the
future. Mankind progresses if there is a constructive competition and collaboration
between wisdom and philosophy.
Let me return to my subject: What
ought to be the relationship between European and African philosophers?
First we must state that philosophers
are human beings like all others, neither more intelligent nor morally better.
So we must understand ourselves on the basic level of gestures and of other
spontaneous, non-reflected signs of sympathy and antipathy which regulate
human communication. I guess that with African peoples the spontaneous intelligence
of man or human empathy are greater than with European.
Aristotle said that without friendship there
is no success in enterprises. This basic emotional and more or less unconscious
understanding dissolves prejudices and makes the mind more disposed to assume
a new, strange view of man and world.
But apart from gestures and other
basic signs like the expression of the eyes man has developed language for
communication. Especially African peoples conserved and transmitted their
treasures of experience and wisdom in an oral way, in narrations, myths, proverbs.
These are symbolic forms of interpretation of existence and of moral norms.
I said that this symbolic orientation in existence is the richest, the most
effective one, and that it is sufficient, since man is first of all a being
conceiving by symbols and not just an intellectual being.
For the purposes of a communication
on the level of symbolic conception of the world and in the domain of intercultural
relationship, philosophy defined as a logical operation with abstract concepts
is not necessary, but it can be very useful. History gives to us many examples
of very fruitful intercultural exchanges and mixtures without any intervention
of philosophy. For an understanding between men of different cultural horizons
the basic categorical level of conditions of life and work, as described above,
is sufficient. Living together creates a growing intuitive comprehension of
symbols, in recourse to the categorical basis of life. So we have to face
the fact that the best judges of men were seldom philosophers.
But I think that the human mind tends
toward a fully intellectual penetration of what symbols communicate and consequently
of the world. In this way philosophy comes in. No intercourse of different
cultures is requested as a basis for philosophy. I believe that each culture
contains a sufficient number of contradictions, absurdities and morally revolting
facts which initiate philosophical inquiry.
But I do not want to deny that the
meeting of different cultures is very fruitful for understanding ourselves
and mankind in general. In order to understand
our own cultural horizon, we need distance from it and an exterior point of
view. Intercultural communication advances to a consciously reflected and
intellectual understanding of symbols and of the world; in this way we can
communicate and find out why we symbolize in this or in that manner
and what is the true ground of things.
Therefore, we must elaborate and define
abstract philosophical concepts which we do not just find in culture. (Later
on, philosophical or scientific concepts may enter the cultural treasure,
like 'substance', 'quintessence' and so on.) After defining those concepts,
we can examine which intellectual meaning we can accord to symbolic speech
and to interpretations.
I shall exemplify this in defending
with emphasis the book of Placide Tempels [1] on 'Bantu
philosophy', not considering his
missionary aspiration and his passing shot at the moral state of European
societies, saying that Bantu people respect much more than Europeans the natural
moral law.
Last year, giving a seminar on African
philosophy at my university, I recognised that the by far most efficient access
for my students to African thought was Tempels ' book! For what reason?
Kwame Gyekye's book [2] which we all know is certainly more
careful with its serious scientific
claim to differentiate and to prove what had been said by references. But
my students were not very satisfied. They learned the different names and
ideas of divinities, the characteristics of wise men and so on. But
Gyekye never gives an answer to the question why Akan
people say so. He carefully describes
Akan thinking, but he does not inquire the reasons of these conceptions nor
does he show the interdependencies and consequences of conceptions in other
areas of thinking about human existence and action. Philosophical questions
arise after reading this book.
On the contrary, Tempels' book is surely deficient in view
of scientific standards. But you cannot say that it is a naive study without
method. Tempels uses a concept of being which will be misunderstood by those
who look out for a scholastic, Christian content, concluding that he
glosses Bantu thinking over with European forms
of thought. On the contrary: his conception of being is formally well-defined:
according to the Aristotelian philosophy, we need for metaphysics a concept
which is empty in content. It is the concept of being. You form this concept
by progressive abstraction of all concrete characteristics of beings (like
life, matter, society and so on); thus we dispose of an empty concept which
only refers to existence as such and which enables us to formulate propositions
about the totality of beings. This concept has no longer a cultural background;
it is formed by a clear logical operation which can be understood by members
of all cultures. Tempels uses this concept for a comparative study of the
fundamental conception of existence or being. For him, Bantu has a very dynamic
conception, confining being according to the Parmenidian saying: what is,
is, what is not, does not exist. And he indicates possible consequences of
this conception in the family and in social relationships, in moral life and
justice.
I am not suggesting that everything
he says is right. It’s all very provisional. African colleagues say that the
Bantu conception of being or of God is
not so univocal; the European conception is less monolithic too. But Tempels'
book is an effort to give Europeans
access to the Bantu conception of existence by logically well-defined steps.
It seems to me that the concept of force as well as the concept of existence
will be understood everywhere, because there is a spontaneous, basic categorical
knowledge of them. So Tempels transmits to us an idea of profound characters,
of the interior life and connections of the Bantu world view, and we can confront
them with our own conceptions; in this way we can obtain more profoundness
in thinking and mutual understanding.
We must go on in this manner without
fear to attack cultural biotopes. Perhaps Europeans will never understand
Bantu or Akan thought completely. But do
we understand each other fully, if we are members of the same culture? Everybody
has his own consciousness, and there is a solitude of each consciousness which
will never be abolished. We must leave the archivist domain (in the sense
of Nietzsche ) of our intercultural relationship,
which is better looked after by ethnology. Philosophy must not be retrospective,
but rather prospective.
My students were not so eager to know
how many divinities there are according to different African peoples. And
they were not excited to learn that there are elements of Platonism or parts
of the categorical imperative in African traditions. Surely it is a primary
necessity to conserve oral traditions by systematic studies like that of Gyekye . But my students were interested
in finding out if there was a new and unexpected view of existence which might
enrich their thinking and make it possible for them to surmount philosophical
prejudices and which could help to emancipate themselves intellectually from
their teachers. They wanted to discuss and develop the philosophical questions
which arise. We also should do so.
When I went to Ivory Coast for the
first time I prepared a text about the problem of teaching philosophy. But
while staying there and listening to the first debates, I wrote hastily an
other text. I was inclined to intervene directly because I noticed that they
had all studied in France or had had French teachers. In France, the philosophical
élite, instructed by the Ecole Normale Supérieur, knows exactly the same authors
and ignores the others altogether. So I proposed to pay more attention to
English philosophers and to recent German philosophy. Next time, I presented
Helmut Plessner and I spoke about the question whether
Marxism is definitely dead. I noticed a certain embarrassment. Coming from
another social, cultural and historical context, I formulated arguments from
an unexpected point of view. Marxism, when judged against the background of
German historical and social experiences, appears in a different light.
I believe that this other light, cast
from different cultural and social backgrounds onto our familiar philosophical
conceptions, is fruitful for our philosophical reflection and our human progress
, and that it is the essence of our
relationship. There is nothing more dangerous than just sticking to our habits
of thinking. Narrowing our perception, they do not let us face change and
new realities. There exists a tiredness of ideas. Having red too many books
about the human subject, emancipation and liberty, we get tired of these ideas.
And we are charmed by the new idea that the subject does not exist. Karl Marx
said that the product of our activity
constitutes itself as an extraneous power. Parisian intellectuals, talking
so much and writing so many books, believe that reality is nothing but discourse.
They confound words with things. Leaving their cultural biotope, they would
notice that there is a hard reality behind words which is not at all susceptible
to their words and discourses.
For twenty years now I have given
lectures on existentialism at the University of Bochum. I wrote some books
on Camus and Sartre,, and finally I got tired of existentialism.
Becoming acquainted with Africa, I saw existentialism in another, new light,
and I rediscovered its force. I am
engaged in studying the work of Helmut Plessner who is unknown in the French-speaking
world. He took notice of the biological existence of man which was totally
neglected by Sartre. Thus, contact with Africa was an occasion which helped
me to develop my point of view.
The next step was that I asked my
friend Yacouba Konaté to come to us to advance intellectual
development in Germany. For forty years Western Germany has lived peacefully
in the shadow of the Berlin wall and the American military basis. Not involved
in military conflicts and in the contradictions of international engagements,
we tend to consider ourselves as having higher moral standards and as being
more reasonable than other people. By that the Germans have become very provincial.
Now the Wall is broken downs and the American forces leave, we are exposed
to all the winds of the world. Africa has known the winds of the world already
for a long time. African people live with intercultural collisions. They have
learned to organize themselves in a life full of cultural contradictions and
they know how to profit from it. So African experience is useful for us, for
Germans have to become more cosmopolitan.
Above all, artistic life is an encouraging
example of the fruitfulness of intercultural confrontations. Heinz Kimmerle
has emphasized it in his sensitive
book on African philosophy. We must act like African artists. We must not
petrify our relationship in studies on traditions and in search for past African
cultural identity. Surely, there is the task to rescue the traditional African
thinking which is one of the great intellectual and moral heritages of mankind.
But I don’t expect completely new ideas from African traditional thought.
The possibilities of thinking are reduced to a limited number of logical operations
which, starting from the same questions, have similar results everywhere.
So I am not surprised to learn that there are Platonic forms of thinking in
the traditional thought of Benin.
Let’s act like the artists. Let’s
imagine our future together. I think that cultural biotopes are condemned
to die all over the world. And nostalgic feelings are not useful. I spent
my youth in Münster. It’s a wonderful town with a Romanesque cathedral and
streets of traditional buildings. We learned Latin and Greek in the shadow
of the cathedral and the Catholic faith. It was an intact cultural biotope.
I experienced it as a prison.
Today, philosophers are challenged
to conceive what a life without cultural identity might be like. And they
are challenged to fight for ideas of justice and liberty. Napoleon said that
there are two powers in the world: the sabre and the intellect. He was convinced
that the intellect will defeat the sabre in the end.
Philosophers are not so much responsible
for traditions, but for the ideas which exist in the minds of men. We are
called to take care of implanting ideas which guide men towards a life in
dignity and liberty. These ideas exist in various cultural interpretations.
We have no time to loose.
I think that the solution of the African
crisis depends neither on economic aid nor on a return to the sources of traditions
or to African cultural identity, but on institutions of general public instruction
and on the dissemination of enlightenment which assures stable political conditions
of liberty and equality. I don’t think that enlightenment is sufficiently
disseminated in Europe or that it is an integral part of the European culture.
I think we must distinguish between the contents of European enlightenment
and enlightenment as a form of facing or contesting inequalities. Structuralism
emphasized that social life is based everywhere on an equality of exchanged
gifts, whatever these gifts might be: women, animals, goods. The notion of
equality, present in all cultures, is the germ of enlightenment. As you know,
justice has always been defined as a form of equality.
In Europe like everywhere else enlightenment
is an explosive potential, regarding cultures which are systems of exploitation
and oppression of man. For those who profit from the established order, enlightenment
always seems an alien element to culture. We do not know well enough, what
enlightenment in the context of the African culture will be and can be. Philosophers
can help to bring forth this knowledge.
Notes
1 I am refering
to the German translation: Philosophie der Bantu. Heidelberg 1956.
2 An Essay on
African Philosophical Thought. Cambridge 1987.
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