IFK STICHTING VOOR INTERKULTURELE FILOSOFIE EN KUNST
Heinz Kimmerle/Henk Oosterling (eds)
Sensus communis in multi- and intercultural
perspective
On the possibility of common judgments in arts and politics
Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann 2000
INTRODUCTION
The following reflections on ‘Sensus communis in multi- and
intercultural perspective. On the possibility of common judgments in arts and
politics’ have served as a guideline or general orientation for the discussions
about this subject on the conference, which is mentioned in the Foreword. They
have been revised after the conference and can hopefully provide a tentative
framework for philosophical and integrated research of different disciplines in
this field. 1. Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Judgment (1791),
introduces the presupposition of a sensus communis, in order to make it
possible that aesthetic judgments can be conceived as transcendentally valid. He
intends to state by this, that the human subject when it finds a piece of
art beautiful, will have the feeling that any other subject (or, even any
reasonable being) has to share this judgment. It is amazing enough that Kant,
who stresses the transcendental validity of reason and understanding in his
theoretical and especially in his practical philosophy, thinks of a feeling
(sensus) as an instance that can guarantee such a claim in the field of
aesthetics. We do not want to go deeper into the interpretation of this fact
here. But we take it as a sign that Kant’s argumentation is problematic under
the conditions of today’s thought, when questions about the possibility and
transcendental validity of common aesthetic judgments are raised within and
outside the Kantian realm of argumentation. 2. By these questions it has become
obvious that transcendentality or general and necessary validity, as it is
claimed by Kant in different fields of philosophy, can no longer be defended in
contemporary philosophical thought. It is especially questionable with
regard to aesthetic judgments. On the other hand, there is no doubt that
aesthetic judgments are accompanied by the feeling that others will share it.
That leads us to the problem: if the position is no longer acceptable that my
aesthetic judgments have to be shared by all other subjects, who are the others
that actually do share them and what kind of community is constituted by
such common judgments? Kant's argumentation has to prove its power in the field
of historically, socially, politically and geographically limited areas of
validity. If the sensus communis is limited in this way, there is no longer a
universal consensus, but common judgments are related to the historical, social
or cultural groups who agree on them. At the same time a dissensus has to be
stated with regard to other groups who have a different taste and different
judgments. Thus not only the conditions of commonalities in the field of
aesthetic judgments have to be investigated, but also of particularities in this
field. 3. One can observe that common aesthetic judgments often have to do
with the preference of persons for a certain style of art. For instance, those
who have in common that they like classical music are in most cases others than
the fans of reggae or house-music. Corresponding agreements and differences can
be found in the fields of visual and performing arts and in literature. For
instance, many persons are fond of realistic or impressionistic painting,
which might mean that they do not like surrealistic or conceptual art. Certain
groups of people like more traditional ways of theater and of writing, others
prefer extremely experimental styles. This kind of preferences is generally
rather stable among adult persons. They change sometimes in the transition
from juvenile to adult age. 4. It is not easy to point out what relations exist
between groups of persons who share a preference for certain periods or currents
of artistic style and the social stratification or political options
of these people. Empirical research can help to improve the knowledge about
these relations. It is, however, obvious that aesthetic judgments can be
shared among persons of different cultures. The cultural dividing line between
them can be passed over rather easily when pieces of art are under discussion.
Often Western friends of classical music share their taste with people from
Japan or China, informal painting finds its admirers and its opponents in the
West, in the East, and in the South, and certain novels even from seemingly
remote parts of the globe (e.g. Nigeria or Columbia) are read all over the
world. What happens also rather often in present time, is the emergence of new
aesthetic judgments which are shared by groups of persons from different
cultures. Music-styles like jazz or reggae arose in the Black communities of the
USA or of the Carribean Islands and spread over the rest of the world.
African wood carving, sand-tableaus from the Australian Aboriginals or
the huge sculptures of the Easter Islands find admirers in all the
different cultures. 5. This kind of common aesthetic judgments among persons of
different cultures is of great importance in multi- and intercultural
respect. These terms are used here in the following meaning:
Multicultural issues deal with problems which arise when people of
different cultures live together in the same geographical area or on the
territory of the same state, and intercultural issues deal with problems
which arise when people of different cultures, living in different geograhical
areas, communicate with each other regularly. In bost cases phenomena of
misunderstanding and of ‘xenophobia’ are very frequent. These phenomena
prevail in most of the political and social debates on multi- and
interculturality. It turns out to be very difficult to find an unbiased and
reasonable basis for the reflections on this problem. As a counterpart to
misunderstanding and ‘xenophobia’ it is important to sort out fields of
agreement and of shared judgments in multicultural societies and in
intercultural communications. At the same time, it is important to
show what the positive effects of particular points of view can be. The focus of
the contributions of this volume is mainly on commonalities and particularities
of aesthetic judgements in the intercultural dimension. 6. No special argument
is needed to make clear that agreements and shared judgements in aesthetics have
in itself a political dimension. It is helpful for the mutual understanding
among persons of different cultures in general, if they share aesthetic
judgments. The connection between aesthetic and political judgments, however,
might even be more substantial and integrate. As the artistic taste is
accompanied by the feeling of being shared by others, the political
will certainly is not a purely individualistic affair. A sensus communis seems
to be presupposed here as well. J.-J. Rousseau's analyses of the ‘general
will’, in his Social Contract (1762), are well known. Although the
‘general will’ is not necessarily identical with the ‘will of all’, it
can be regarded as the basis for political decisions of a
community. This is not referred to as a justification of some kind of
majority-rule which does not sufficiently take into account the will and the
desires of the minority-groups. However, the fact cannot be denied that there
are groups who share more conservative political options and others who can
more easily agree on necessary changes. Conservative, socialist and also liberal
ideologies still bind together groups of persons. These are examples for sensus
communis in the field of political judgments. They imply that it is also
necessary to take the conditions of positive or useful particularities into
account. 7. Obviously this kind of judgments can transgress dividing cultural
borderlines as well: The broad international organizations of socialist or
christian-democratic parties can illustrate that their agreement on certain
political judgments is interculturally relevant. Many Africans,
whether they live on their own continent or in the diaspora, are in a
predicament, because they have high estimations of their traditional
cultural values and at the same time welcome rapid social changes. Therefore, it
is uncertain which respective political currents they will want to join. With
regard to Western multicultural societies it is worthwile to mention that
the borderlines of political options are no longer very clear: not all people of
little income are in favour of socialist politics, the adherents of liberal
ideas are spread among different social groups, and not all leading persons in
economic life tend to conservative political options. It is hardly possible to
say, where which groups of persons from non-Western cultures join in. Since the
end of apartheid South African politics shows the breath-taking example of
regarding multiculturalism as a chance and as a positive starting point for a
democratic state. 8. As already has been said, majority-rule does not always and
not automatically carry out the ‘general will’ of a community. There are
forms of democratic government, also in Western democratic states, which
are not ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people’, as Abraham
Lincoln once has formulated it. Sometimes a gap can be found between the
will and the desires of the people and the politics which is made by a formally
chosen democratic government. In the present day world G.W.F. Hegel’s statement
in his Philosophy of Right (1821), that the modern constitutional state is the
only apt political organization to guarantee ‘concrete freedom’, can be doubted.
This doubt arises once we regard certain phenomena in the political life of the
Western hemisphere. It is even more problematic if the Western model of
democracy is applied in non-Western countries. 9. In intercultural
philosophical discussions other forms of political life have been described in
which decisions are taken not by majority, but by consensus. Very instructive is
in this connection the chapter: ‘Democracy and Consensus: A Plea for a Non-Party
Policy’ in a book of Kwasi Wiredu.1 Political decision- making on the basis of
consensus can be regarded as an alternative to Western democracy within the
realm of a nation-state. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, in his article Beyond Elite
Politics of Democracy in Africa2, attempts to shape a ‘new mode of
politics’ which is inspired by certain African ways of coming to political
decisions (‘palaver’ and ‘mbongi’) that carry out the principle of
consensus. He fails, however, to make clear how these ways of decision-making
can lead in contemporary African states from ‘elite politics’ to ‘mass
men/women-democracy’. Mahmud Mamdani, in an interview On Democracy and
Human Rights3, points at specific forms of political life in traditional African
communities, which have been called ‘tribes’ by the colonial administration and
which have to be taken into account if the Human Rights, as they have
originated in Western history, are reconsidered and extended from an
African point of view. This reference to traditional community life in Africa is
combined with ideas rooted in socialist theory, when Mandani claims that Human
Rights should not only be applied to the communities of citizens (of a
nation-state), but also to members of the communities of labour. This would be
in favour of the many migrating workers who live in nation-states of which they
are not citizens. 10. At this point, again the connection between
aesthetic and political judgments has to be reflected upon. Kant speaks,
with regard to aesthetic judgments, about the ‘free play’ of the faculties of
the mind (sensitivity and understanding). In accordance with
this, the communities which are constituted by common
artistic taste are based on the free choice of their members. If there is
not only a sensus communis aestheticus, but, as I want to suggest,
also a sensus communis politicus, an analogy to aesthetic judgments can be
found in the field of politics: the same kind of ‘free play’ should be practised
in the constitution of the groups which share political options and which
contribute to the ‘general will’ of a community. Thus the possibility
could be created to implement ways of decision-making in political life
which are more basically democratic and also to give rights to groups of
persons which are positioned crosswise to the nation-states. This would be an
importand step towards more emancipation which is not necessarily combined with
modernization of the Western style. Historical conditions of Western and
non-Western countries and the adherence to different religions and worldwiews
come into play when we reflect on these problems. 11. During the conference, the
suggestion has come up that the final grounds for common judgments in the fields
of aesthetics, politics, history, religion and worldviews are to be found in
universal human values or inclinations. However, this suggestion has to be
thought through under the conditions of the Kantian claim of transcendental
validity and of the critique on this claim. In other words, can we think about
universalism without re-affirming transcendentalism? In order to answer this
question, the relation between universals and particulars has to be discussed
again. Kwame Gyekye from Ghana has pointed out and defended in the discussions,
that ‘there must be at least a tacit or implicit or unexpressed agreement’,
which is universally valid, ‘on the reality and importance of the notion of the
common good’. Without such a universal consensus on the basic thoughts and
values, according to him we could not proceed from the assumption that common
aesthetic, political, historical or religious judgments are posibble in multi-
and intercultural communication. Ryôsuke Ohashi’s position, which is determined
by his Japanese background, implies that such an agreement has to be thought of
not only as unexpressed, but as unexpressable, as an ‘empty space’. His analysis
of the aesthetic being in traditional Japanese puppet-theatre, which is real and
at the same time not real, could be applied to this more general question. Such
a position would mean that we cannot articulate universal human values or
inclinations as such, but nevertheless can look forward to them and judge their
particular cultural appearances. Notes 1. K. Wiredu: Cultural Universals ans
Prticulars. An African perspective. Bloomington and Indianapolis 1996, p.
182-190. 2. In: Quest. An International African Journal of Philosophy, 6,1
(1992), p. 28-42. 3. In: ZAST (Zeitschrift für Afrikastudien), nr. 13/14 (1992),
p. 3-8.
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