Review of U. Loelke's book by H. Kimmerle

Kritische Traditionen: Afrika. Philosophie als Ort der Dekolonisation, by Ulrich Lˆlke.

Frankfurt/M.: IKO ñ Verlag f¸r Interkulturelle Kommunikation, 2001, 250 pp.,ISBN 3-88939-552-X

The book of Lˆlke has served as a PhD-thesis at the University of D¸sseldorf in 1999. It is a remarkable fact that his dissertation on ëAfrican philosophyí has been accepted at this university. For, it was Prof. Alwin Diemer who introduced this subject to the international philosophical discourse when he organized the 16^th World Congress of Philosophy at the University of D¸sseldorf in 1978. At this congress he arranged for the first time a symposium on ëPhilosophy in the present situation of Africaí. [1] Nine African philosophers participated in this symposium. Five years later he called together a much larger number of African philosophers to discuss the subject ëAfrica and the problem of its identityí. [2] Since 1978 the World Congresses of Philosophy are an important forum for African philosophers.

However, African philosophy has not become an acknowledged topic at German universities. This can be illustrated by Lˆlkeís commentary on the XV. Deutscher Kongrefl f¸r Philosophie at Hamburg in 1990: ëIt is interesting that the section ëGegenwart der Philosophie in Afrikaí, which has been chaired by J¸rgen Hengelbrock, has not been attended by German philosophers and thus has not been acknowledged as suchí (p.116, note 3).† Many other examples of this attitude could be given among most of the German philosophers. On the European continent research and teaching in the field of African philosophy has been established only at Erasmus University Rotterdam and at the University of Vienna. This situation is changing with a number of younger German philosophers like Lˆlke who have done or are doing their PhD-research on problems of African philosophy. [3] Lˆlke had still to lean on A. Diemerís merits of introducing African philosophy to the World Congresses of Philosophy when he succeeded to find the successor on Diemerís chair at the University of D¸sseldorf, Prof. N. Henrichs, ready to be his ëDoktorvaterí (p. 5).††

There is a specific context of ëintercultural philosophyí on the German philosophical scene, although this context is kept also in the margin of the official university departments. The ëGesellschaft f¸r interkulturelle Philosophieí, under the presidency of R.A. Mall who stems from India, offers a forum also for African philosophy. And Lˆlkeís book is published in the series ëDenktraditionen im Dialog: Studien zur Befreiung und Interkulturalit‰tí, edited by R. Fornet-Betancourt who comes from South America and is especially linked to ëIKO - Verlag f¸r Interkulturelle Kommunikationí.

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Despite of this somehow narrow-minded German background with regard to African philosophy, Lˆlke has been able to give an original contribution to the international discussion of this subject and to the global philosophical discourse in which it has to be situated. His main issue is the concept of tradition. About this concept he is in a dialogue with the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye. [4] In his book Tradition and Modernity, Gyekye tries hard to work out what the concept of tradition means. Discussing especially the book of E. Shils: Tradition (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), he comes to the result that one can speak only of a tradition if a set of ëcultural valuesí has been handed on to at least two generations. [5] Lˆlke confronts Gyekyeís analyses with the anti-traditionalism of Western Enlightenment and of what is called ëmodernityí. His critical assessment of Gyekyeís position includes also K.R. Popperís appraisal of tradition in the process of scientific research and H.-G. Gadamerís conception of a dialogue with history in the humanities which tries to avoid the pitfalls of both Enlightenment and Romanticism (pp. 193-195 and 209-212, 178-179).

Lˆlke agrees with Gyekye that tradition has to be dealt with in a critical way, that tradition in itself is not authoritative, but reflective. He interprets, however, the Akan symbol of Sankofa to which Gyekye refers repeatedly (in combination with Ofamfa), not as going back to the past (Sankofa) and then examining the past critically (Ofamfa). ëThe bird which is bending its head to pick an egg on its backí, which one sees on the Sankofa symbol, ëcan also be understood as bending back over oneís neck by reflectingí on the present knowledge of the past which has to be revived (p. 221). Tradition is, according to Lˆlke, especially and before all ëliving traditioní or as he says by quoting the French formulation of A. HampatÈ B‚: ëtradition vivanteí (p. 165, note 2). Lˆlke criticizes Gyekye for working with a reÔfied concept of generations. It is not just by sticking to the same cultural values for two times 20 to 30 years that (eventually, in the third generation) a tradition is produced. The ëcrux of the concept of traditioní is something different: ëA tradition is a pattern, a ritual or, also, a more complex cultural and social connection of which the transmission is no longer in the hands of those who have invented themí. That means, there has to be ëat least one generation between the inventor and the recipient of a traditioní. Therefore, to sketch the production of a tradition we have not to talk about (at least) three, but two ëgenerationsí and it does not help to clarify the systematic problem, if one measures the years, which constitute a generation (p. 203).††††††

The main point of Lˆlke and Gyekye is that Africa exists at present between tradition and modernity. These two concepts have to be understood as general terms, characterizing the influences of the respective past in present times. [6] This ëintermediate spaceí is worked out systematically by V.Y. Mudimbe in his The Invention of Africa (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988). Mudimbe tries to get beyond the dichotomies of dialectical thought, such as ëtraditional vs. modern, oral vs. written, agrarian/customary communities vs. urban/industrialized civilization, subsistence economies vs. highly productive economiesí (p. 114-115). The problem is that, as a consequence of the processes of colonization in the past, during which changing Western discourses about Africa have been imposed on this continent, in the present time Africa has lost its identity. Thus there is no transition possible from the past to the present. That does not mean, so Lˆlke states with Mudimbe, that we have to see African Philosophy in Search of Identityí, like D.A. Masolo formulates it in the title of his book (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994). It is the combination of identity and reason in the discourse of this book, which brings it close to the interpretation schemes of colonial rulers (p. 122-123).

In between colonization and an uncertain future, philosophy in Africa can be a space/place (ëOrtí is the word in the title of Lˆlkeís book) of decolonization. It is the double meaning of a geographical and a mental space/place, which is functioning in colonization and decolonization, as Mudimbe puts it (p. 114). Philosophy can try to single out elements of Africaís own consciousness (and not more than that), by deconstructing imposed Western images of the continent. After the battles for independence have been fought, philosophy is now engaged in the liberating enterprise by criticizing the ëpower of speechí and building up a counter-power in this field. Y. KonatÈ contributes to this strategic task by showing that there is not only one rationality, namely the Western type, which is mainly a scientific-technical one, but several different types of rationality. [7] By finding out the specific type of rationality, which is incorporated in the living African tradition, philosophy can help to make the crisis of the continent to a place/space of death and rebirth at the same time (p. 116-119).††††

Prominent examples of† ëDecolonizing the mindí or ëConceptual Decolonizationí, to use the formulations of Ngugi wa Thiongío and Kwasi Wiredu, [8] are the projects of† ëSage philosophyí. Lˆlke concentrates on H. Odera Orukaís Kenyan project, mainly among the Luo, Kisii, Gikuyu and Meru peoples, and K. Gyekyeís interviews of wise men and women among different groups of the Akan in Ghana. He leaves out A. HampatÈ B‚ís important report of the life and teaching of Tierno Bokar, the sage of Bandiagara, the capital of the Dogon area in Mali. [9] The most important step of these projects is that they are done in African indigenous languages, although the written documentation is in English or French. According to Lˆlke, Odera Orukaís main target is to refute R. Hortonís thesis, that ëAfrican traditional thoughtí is ëclosedí, while the knowledge of† ëWestern scienceí is ëopení. [10] There are sages in Kenyan traditional societies who deserve to be called ëphilosophical sagesí because they do not only transfer the knowledge and wisdom of their peoples, like ëfolk sagesí do, but critically think about it and evaluate it (p. 165-168).

In about the same period of time when Odera Oruka started his project in Kenya, which is finally documented in Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy [11] , Gyekye interviewed a number of Akan sages in Ghana, in the process of preparing his book: An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme [12] . Lˆlke sees Gyekyeís aim before all in showing that ëthere were sages in Africaís cultural pastí, that is to say as a decisive part of historical research (p. 153-164). He criticizes Oruka and Gyekye for making living traditions historical by presenting contemporary sages as people of a period in the past. And he refers to critical remarks against Orukaís strict borderline between ëphilosophical sagesí and ëfolk sagesí, which is inspired by the Western model of criticism and rationality (p. 152 and 158). Different to the estimations of Gyekye, he regards orality not primarily as a deficiency, but as ëan own qualityí (p.168).† He could have made these references more complete and his re-estimation of orality much stronger, if he had taken notice of my efforts in these fields. [13]

Lˆlkeís reconstructions of Negritude (especially of what L.S. Senghor has made of it) and of ethnophilosophy on the one hand and of the critical discourses of P.J. Hountondji and M. Towa against these currents in African philosophy on the other hand, precede the chapters of his book, which I have reviewed up to now.† Lˆlke follows Hountondjiís and Towaís critique of Negritude and ethnophilosophy in saying that both currents stick to the Western conceptual framework by just formulating oppositions to it. And he also agrees with these authors that it is not correct to reduce African traditional philosophy to collective thought, which has to be worked out and systematized by others. But he recognizes, too, that Hountondjiís and Towaís ëdialectical confrontationí with the Western ways of speaking about Africa does not open a place/space to escape the ëclassical order of thingsí in Western thought, which is followed up by the ëmodern orderí in the course of the 19^th and 20^th century, as Mudimbe says by using M. Foucaultís theoretical approach (p. 111-113).††††

With regard to these reconstructions I want to make two critical remarks. There is not one correct way of doing African philosophy. Negritude and ethnophilosophy, and also their critique by Hountondji and Towa are stages on the way of working out African philosophy. The dialectical framework of thought which is applied by J.P. Sartre to justify Negritude (also the version which is worked out by Senghor) as an ëantiracist racismí, [14] remains useful and correct with regard to this period. According to me, this framework of thought can be extended to the writings of Hountondji and Towa as an antithesis to Negritude and ethnophilosophy. It is, indeed, Mudimbe who gets beyond these dialectical oppositions and with them beyond the attitude of simple ëhatred against (neo-)colonial guardianshipí, which were on their place in former times. [15] And Gyekye goes a step further on this way. He comes to an even more differentiated approach of Africaís colonial past. In the interview with Lˆlke, which I have mentioned above (note 4), he says (on p. 96-97): ëWhat we really need to do, I argue, is to re-evaluate, re-interpret, and re-assess the cultural values, practices, and institutions that we have inherited from both our own traditions and the colonial heritage. The colonial heritage cannot be completely jettisoned. We live in a postcolonial era, but this era, surely, does not necessarily mean the rejection of all the colonial values and institutions that we have adopted. Even though they were all originally imposed on us, we have come to adopt them; we are practicing them; and we are trying to function within them. Whether we are doing so successfully or not is another matter.í

Lˆlke presents Gyekyeís contribution to African philosophy in the Essay on African philosophical thought as a form of ëSage philosophyí, which he compares with Odera Orukaís. He mentions also the other sources, which Gyekye uses to systematize the Akan conceptual scheme, but he does not acknowledge them in the same measure as the interviews with the sages. Gyekye himself summarizes these sources in the following way: ëoral literatureí and ëthe thoughts and actions of the peopleí; more in detail: ëproverbs, myths and folktales, folk songs, rituals, beliefs, customs, and traditions of the peopleí. [16] It is no doubt that his method of doing African philosophy is not only that of making use of ësagacious reasoningí, but also that of some kind of ethnophilosophy. In his own interwiew with Gyekye (note 4), Lˆlke could have understood the great importance, which this African philosopher gives to language (see on p. 83-84): ëThere is a dynamic relationship between the language of a people and their thought, beliefs, and their valuesí. And the writings of Gyekye testify more than clearly that he often works with proverbs, being something like texts in an oral tradition. In this sense also Aristotle was an ethnophilosopher, for when he ëbegan his philosophical inquiries, he started on the language, providing technical meanings to the expressions of the Greek languageí.

At the end of his book, Lˆlke turns to ëpostcolonial traditionsí, transcending in his own discourse decolonization as the (only) space/place of African philosophy. The last project of Odera Oruka, a theory of† ëglobal justiceí, on the basis of a ëParental Earth Ethicsí, had already earlier attracted his attention. [17] Oruka argues that it is necessary to grant sufficient means of existence to everybody in the world, before ethical claims can be made. He suggests that the relations between the different parts of the world should be organized in the manner of family relations in Africa. His ëphilosophy of concrete responsibiltyí is on the way to ëa more and more Ö global discourse of philosophyí, which goes beyond the regional structures. This is thought, according to Lˆlke, in the continuation of the line of ëSage philosophyí. For the sages always stress the practical relevance of knowledge and wisdom, and their acceptance among the African communities is clearly higher than that of academic philosophy in the West. Considering these conceptions, the American philosopher Gail Presbey presents ëthe African philosophers as a challenge for academic philosophersí of the West (p. 230-233, the Presbey-quotation is on p. 232).

Orukaís last project should lead to the possibility that the ësubaltern can speakí. Lˆlke opens up this perspective by referring to G.Ch. Spivakís research which makes use of the ideas of French philosophers of difference (not only Foucault, from whom Mudimbe and Lˆlke already have borrowed certain methods, but also G. Deleuze and J. Derrida). To get to this point, it is necessary that the intellectuals of the Western world no longer speak for the subaltern, but that they speak to them and with them, like Oruka and Gyekye did when they visited the sages. According to Spivak, ësilenced areasí (geographically and socially) are produced in the world by ëthe epistemic violence of imperialism and the international division of labourí. This cannot be overcome, if the Western intellectuals speak vicariously for the subaltern, but only if they understand the mechanisms of their own dominating way of speaking. That is not yet the solution of the problem, but it disarranges the self-satisfied position of the intellectuals. Their task ëis not to represent (vertreten)í the subaltern, ëbut to learn to represent (darstellen)í themselves (p. 221-227, Spivak-quotations on p. 220 and 224).

This brings me, finally, to the first chapter of Lˆlkeís book. The Western cultural anthropologists or ethnologists often do not even speak for, but of or about the indigenous peoples, which they describe. They want to make the beliefs and practices of these peoples understandable to themselves and their readers. That is to say, they interpret these beliefs and practices from their own standards of rationality. Following H.-G. Gadamer, P. Winch, and Th. Nagel, Lˆlke makes clear that in this literature Western rationality is erroneously universalized by claiming to practice a ëview from nowhereí. L. Wittgenstein provides a way of thought by which magical worldviews or phenomena of sorcery and witchcraft cannot and should not be understood in the manner of scientific explanations, but in the manner of ënarrativesí (Erz‰hlungen) which have their own plausibility and acceptance (p. 37-42). This concept is methodically important for Lˆlkeís whole discourse.

S.B. Oluwole shows that it is not in correspondence with the rational and scientific basis of Western philosophy itself to claim that these phenomena are impossible, just because their possibility up to now cannot be proved (p. 44-48). She argues that while some Western scientists and philosophers ëbelieve that witchcraft is supernatural in the sense of ìbeing beyond explanationî Ö they are in fact making a mistake Ö all it means is that it is ìnot yet explainedî. So the possibility of an explanation may exist at least in the future.í However, also according to Oluwole, the ëAfrican doctorí or magician is not interested in rational explanation of witchcraft in the Western sense. ëHe understands it well enough to be able to influence and to manipulateí. Therefore, she finds it biased and prejudiced ëto deny the occurrence of something just because we have not ourselves experienced ití. [18] †††

Notes

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